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REMARKS: NEUROSCIENCE, GENDER, AND THE LAW 
Stacey A. Tovino, JD, PhD∗ 
Thank you very much to Jane Moriarty for inviting me to speak 
during today’s Neuroscience, Law, and Government Symposium. 
As we have seen from the earlier talks today, the burgeoning 
neurolaw literature focuses very heavily on the implications of advances 
in neuroscience for criminal responsibility, criminal procedure, capital 
punishment, national security, and evidence law.1  My passion is civil 
and regulatory health law, and what I have been doing over the last 
couple of years is examining the ways in which advances in 
neuroscience are impacting a range of civil and regulatory health law 
issues.2 
In my recent research, I have been exploring the legal impact of 
advances in the neuroscience of gender, such as whether and how 
stakeholders are using recent studies finding structural and functional 
differences between male and female brains in an attempt to influence 
the law.  I also have been examining whether and how stakeholders are 
using the neuroscience of both gender-specific and gender-prevalent 
health conditions to influence the interpretation of civil and regulatory 
 
∗  Associate Professor of Law and Director, Health Law and Policy Center, Drake University Law 
School, Des Moines, Iowa. 
 1. Videos of the Neuroscience, Law and Government Symposium are available at 
http://www.uakron.edu/law/neurosymposium.php. 
 2. See Stacey A. Tovino, Medico-Legal Issues in Neuroimaging, NEUROETHICS IN PRACTICE 
(Martha Farah & Anjan Chatterjee eds., forthcoming 2009); Stacey A. Tovino, Neuroscience and 
Health Law: An Integrative Approach?, 42 AKRON L. REV. 469 (2009); Stacey A. Tovino, 
Neuroimaging Research into Disorders of Consciousness: Moral Imperative or Legal and Ethics 
Failure?, VA. J.L. & TECH. (forthcoming 2009); Stacey A. Tovino, Incidental Findings: A Common 
Law Approach?, 15(4) ACCOUNTABILITY IN RESEARCH 242; Stacey A. Tovino, The Impact of 
Neuroscience on Health Law, 1(2) NEUROETHICS 101 (2008); Stacey A. Tovino, Functional 
Neuroimaging Information: A Case for Neuro Exceptionalism?, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 415 (2007); 
Stacey A. Tovino, Imaging Body Structure and Mapping Brain Function: A Historical Approach, 
33 AM. J.L. & MED. 193 (2007); Stacey A. Tovino, Functional Neuroimaging and the Law: Trends 
and Directions for Future Scholarship, 7(9) AM. J. BIOETHICS-NEUROSCIENCE 44 (2007). 
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health law.  Today, I am going to explore how stakeholders are using 
advances in the neuroscience of three gender-specific and gender-
prevalent conditions (the postpartum mood disorders, premenstrual 
dysphoric disorder, and eating disorders) to secure health care benefits 
under group health plans and individual health insurance policies and to 
push for the inclusion of these conditions in mental health parity 
legislation.  More broadly, I hope to show you how neuroscience is 
quickly becoming a very important tool in the arsenal of health care 
stakeholders and lobbyists, especially those charged with promoting 
women’s access to mental health care. 
My first example relates to the neuroscience of the postpartum 
mood disorders, including postpartum depression and postpartum 
psychosis.  Many of us are familiar with the Andrea Yates case, in which 
a woman from Clear Lake, Texas, drowned her five children in her 
bathtub less than seven months after her fifth child was born.3  The Yates 
case, at least the first trial, was framed by many criminal law scholars in 
terms of the question of whether Andrea knew that what she was doing 
was wrong at the time she did it4 and, more importantly, the 
appropriateness of using this standard for purposes of determining her 
criminal responsibility.5  But for civil and regulatory mental health law 
scholars, medical humanists, and many clinicians, the Yates case is cited 
more frequently as an example of what can happen when postpartum 
mood disorders and other mental health conditions specific to women 
are either not recognized or not successfully treated due in part to a 
fragmented health care system that traditionally has been uncomfortable 
with both mental health conditions (because historically there has been 
very little physical evidence of them) and women’s health conditions, 
which have been tainted with the legacy of Freud’s hysteria.6 
 
 3. Yates v. State of Texas, 171 S.W.3d 215, 218 (Tex. Ct. App. 2005). 
 4. See, e.g., Steven K. Erickson, The Myth of Mental Disorder: Transsubstantive Behavior 
and Taxometric Psychiatry, 41 AKRON L.REV. 67, 75 (2008). 
 5. See id. at 82-83. 
 6. See, e.g., Vanora Hundley, Beyond the Andrea Yates Verdict: Women’s Mental Health 
and the Law, 17(1) MIDIRS MIDWIFERY DIGEST 135, 136 (2007); Faith McLellan, Mental Health 
and Justice: The Case of Andrea Yates, 368(9551) LANCET 1951, 1951 (2006) (noting “[t]he 
[Yates] case also highlighted the lack of recognition of the potentially deadly consequences of 
postnatal disorders, and the limitations of the justice system in dealing with individuals who are 
mentally ill.”); Evelyn G. Kohan, Letter to the Editor, Compassion for Andrea Yates, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 14, 2002, at A30 (stating that “[a]s a professional who devotes energy and time educating the 
public about women’s mental health, I find [Yates’s guilty verdict] demoralizing; it reeks of the vast 
ignorance we have yet to overcome in law and society.”). 
2
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Over the last decade, however, several groups of scientists have 
been using neuroimaging in an attempt to provide neuroradiological 
evidence of several health conditions specific to women, including the 
postpartum mood disorders.7  One small study published ten years ago, 
for example, found that the brains of women with postpartum psychoses 
looked significantly structurally different than the brains of age-matched 
women with non-postpartum psychoses, leading the study authors to 
conclude that they had found evidence of subtle, unspecified neuro-
structural abnormalities in ill mothers and that these abnormalities might 
constitute an unspecific vulnerability factor.8 
In 2006, a second group of scientists used functional magnetic 
resonance imaging (fMRI) to study the brains of healthy mothers as they 
attended audiovisual baby stimuli postpartum.9  The authors found that 
the neural networks of healthy maternal women who were hearing 
babies cry were closely associated with obsessive-compulsive disorder 
(OCD), suggesting that even the healthy maternal brain may be 
“hardwired” for a period of transient OCD that at one time may have 
been adaptive, but now may play a role in postpartum illness.10  The 
 
 7. See infra text accompanying notes 8-18. 
 8. See M. Lanczik et al., Ventricular Abnormality in Patients with Postpartum Psychoses, 1 
ARCH. WOMEN’S MENTAL HEALTH 45, 45-47 (1998) (using computed tomography to quantify the 
ventricular and cisternal cerebrospinal fluid (CSF) spaces in 14 women, 12 of whom had cycloid 
psychoses with postpartum onset; finding that, when compared to age-matched female patients with 
cycloid psychoses or bipolar affective disorders outside the puerperium, certain CSF spaces were 
significantly larger in the postpartum psychosis group); concluding that, “[t]his finding could reflect 
an unspecific brain structural vulnerability marker in some patients with psychoses of the 
puerperium,” id. at 45, and that, “[t]he results underline evidence of subtle, unspecific brain 
structural abnormalities in patients with postpartum cycloid, and possibly other types of postpartum 
psychosis.  Such abnormalities might constitute an unspecific vulnerability factor.”  Id. at 47. 
 9. James Swain et al., Functional Neuroimaging and Psychology of Parent-Infant 
Attachment in the Early Postpartum, 5 ANNALS OF GENERAL PSYCHIATRY S85, S85 (Feb. 28, 2006) 
(concluding that, “[f]urther research on families with mental health vulnerabilities, as well as 
conditions such as postpartum depression and substance abuse, may yield biological models for 
protective and vulnerability factors in human family attachments.”). 
 10. See Anna J. Abramson, The Postpartum Brain, IV(4) GREATER GOOD MAG. (Spring, 
2008), available at http://greatergood.berkeley.edu/greatergood/2008spring/Abramson154.html (last 
visited January 20, 2008). 
[W]hen parents in the Yale study heard their babies cry, the researchers observed activity 
in neural networks closely associated with obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD), as 
well as in brain areas associated with social emotions such as empathy.  Strikingly, it 
seemed that listening to their babies cry triggered a deeply anxious neural response even 
in parents who hadn't been diagnosed with a psychological problem . . . .  The 
researchers offer an evolutionary hypothesis for the neural signs of anxiety they saw in 
these parents.  They believe that, after the birth of a child, a period of high alert may 
have helped parents protect their babies from environmental harm in times when this was 
a treacherous and all-consuming task . . . .  The Yale researchers hypothesize that the 
3
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scientists concluded that further research “may yield biological models 
for protective and vulnerability factors in human family attachments.”11   
In 2007, scientists used fMRI to compare the brain function of 
women with postpartum depression to asymptomatic postpartum female 
control subjects.12  Although the scientists stated that it would be 
premature to conclude that postpartum depression has a unique 
depression phenotype, they thought that functional neuroimaging did 
have the potential to identify an empirically-based neural 
characterization of postpartum depression.13 
In March 2008, scientists published a study that used positron 
emission tomography (PET) to measure brain serotonin receptor binding 
potential in a small sample of both healthy and depressed postpartum 
women.14  The study authors found that postsynaptic receptor binding in 
the depressed subjects was reduced 20-28 percent relative to controls 
and stated that they hoped their discovery of these altered 
neurobiological processes would increase treatment accessibility for 
women.15 
These are just a few of the neuroimaging studies that have been 
designed to investigate the neuroscience of postpartum conditions.  In 
still other studies, authors have concluded that future neuroimaging 
studies may someday provide a method for diagnosing postpartum 
 
healthy maternal brain is hardwired for a period of “transient OCD.” . . . .  But, . . . once 
mothers are endowed with this kind of neural “machinery,” there's a danger they “could 
connect up OCD behaviors with irrational things not for survival.” 
Id. 
 11. Swain, supra note 9, at S85. 
 12. Michael E. Silverman et al., Neural Dysfunction in Postpartum Depression: An fMRI Pilot 
Study, 12(11) CNS SPECTRUMS: INT’L J. NEUROPSYCHIATRIC MED. 853, 853-54(2007).   
 13. Id. at 861. 
[A]lthough it may be premature to conclude that [postpartum depression] is a unique 
depression phenotype, these preliminary findings suggest the potential to identify an 
empirically based neural characterization of [postpartum depression] that will provide a 
necessary cornerstone for developing more targeted, biologically based diagnostic and 
therapeutic strategies specific to mood changes as a consequence of reproductive health. 
Id. 
 14. Eydie Moses-Kolko et al., Serotonin 1A Receptor Reductions in Postpartum Depression: 
A PET Study, 89(3) FERTILITY & STERILITY 685, 685-87 (2008). 
 15. Id. at 685-92 (finding that age, time since delivery, and reproductive hormones did not 
differ between the healthy and depressed postpartum subject groups, but that postsynaptic receptor 
binding in the depressed subjects was reduced 20-28 percent relative to controls, with most 
significant reductions in anterior cingulated and mesiotemporal cortices).  The authors concluded 
that, “[d]iscovery of altered central neurobiological processes in postpartum mood disorders has the 
potential to increase treatment accessibility for women with this disorder, raise the importance of 
postpartum depression treatment among practitioners, and decrease the stigma of postpartum 
depression.”  Id. at 685. 
4
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depression16 and may even be used to predict both maternal style, such 
as child neglect, and offspring temperament, including depression and 
anxiety.17  Today’s scientists continue to use neuroimaging technologies 
in an attempt to better understand the brain structure and function of 
postpartum women.18 
The issue I am currently researching is whether these 
neuroscientific advances are impacting the law that governs access to, 
treatment of, and payment for women’s mental health conditions.  I 
started my research by looking at several old judicial opinions and bills 
involving postpartum depression.  By “old,” I mean older than the last 
ten to fifteen years, which is the period in which the majority of these 
structural and functional neuroimaging studies have been published.  
What I found is that our courts and legislatures tended to find that the 
postpartum mood disorders did not have a physiological or an organic 
basis. 
The 18-year-old case of Blake v. UnionMutual Stock Life Insurance 
Company19 is illustrative.  Blake involved a woman named Pam Blake 
who sued her health insurance company when it refused to classify her 
 
 16. Press Release, National Alliance for Research on Schizophrenia and Depression, 
Pregnancy & Postpartum Depression: New Research Directions, available at 
http://www.narsad.org/news/press/rg_2005/res2005-08-09.html (last visited January 20, 2008) 
(summarizing recent advances in postpartum depression research, including a neuroimaging study 
involving postpartum subjects conducted at the Medical University of South Carolina [MUSC]; 
stating that the findings from the MUSC research “may provide a method for diagnosing postpartum 
depression.”). 
 17. Jeffrey P. Lorberbaum et al., Feasibility of Using fMRI to Study Mothers Responding to 
Infant Cries, 10(3) DEPRESSION & ANXIETY 99, 99-104 (Dec. 30, 1999). 
While parenting is a universal human behavior, its neuroanatomic basis is currently 
unknown . . . .  Future work in this area may help (1) unravel the functional 
neuroanatomy of the parent-infant bond and (2) examine whether markers of this bond, 
such as maternal brain response to infant crying, can predict maternal style (i.e., child 
neglect), offspring temperament, or offspring depression or anxiety. 
Id. at 99. 
 18. Yale Program for Women’s Reproductive Behavioral Health, Research in the Service of 
Patient Care, http://www.med.yale.edu/psych/clinics/YBG.html (last visited Sept. 21, 2008) 
(providing information about the current research projects of the Yale Program for Women’s 
Reproductive Behavioral Health, including the “[d]iagnosis and treatment of postpartum depression 
through a neuro-imaging research protocol (HIC #9958).”). 
This study involves free antidepressant medication and free supportive therapy.  Women 
must be within the first 3 months postpartum and breastfeeding.  Women who are not 
experiencing any mood changes after delivery, and are within the first 3 months 
postpartum and are breastfeeding, are also needed for our control group.  All participants 
can earn up to $200. 
Id. 
 19. 906 F.2d 1525 (11th Cir. 1990). 
5
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postpartum depression as a physical illness.20  Both the United States 
District Court for the Southern District of Florida21 and the Eleventh 
Circuit Court of Appeals22 had to review the evidence provided about 
Pam’s postpartum depression and decide whether she had an organic 
physical illness, which would require the defendant insurer to provide a 
robust set of health insurance benefits, or whether she had a nervous 
disorder, which was subject to a much less desirable benefit set.23  
Although several expert and treating psychiatrists and psychologists 
testified about Pam’s erratic behavior and thoughts, including her 
specific desire to harm her baby within three days of birth, the court 
found that none of the experts could provide any physical, chemical, or 
hormonal tests or measurements that could prove that Pam had a 
physical illness.24  The court thus held that Pam did not have a physical 
or organic illness.25  Blake was published in 1990, so it is only about 
eighteen years old today. 
In the last seven to eight years, however, we have seen a sea of 
change in the legal treatment of the postpartum mood disorders.  We 
now have bills that would prohibit the denial of disability insurance for a 
history of postpartum depression.26  We have bills that would require 
health care providers to educate new mothers and their families about 
 
 20. Id. at 1525-26. 
 21. See Blake v. UnionMutual Stock Life Ins. Co., 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16331, *1-*13 
(S.D. Fla. Mar. 10, 1989). 
 22. Blake, 906 F.2d at 1525. 
 23. Blake, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16331, at *3-4. 
 24. Id. at *8 (noting that “[n]either Pam Blake’s serotonin and neopinephrine levels nor her 
hormonal levels were ever measured so far as this Court is aware . . .  Dr. Moreno’s testimony 
simply failed to prove a physical illness caused Mrs. Blake’s psychiatric hospitalization.”).  The 
11th Circuit adopted the reasoning of the United States District Court for the Southern District of 
Florida in rejecting the Blakes’ argument that Pam Blake’s postpartum treatment was covered as a 
sickness under the policy.  Blake, 906 F.2d at 1527. 
As to the argument that Pam Blake's postpartum treatment was covered by the 
“sickness” provisions of the policy, a review of the record reveals that the district court 
must be affirmed on the findings of fact and reasoning under the proper de novo standard 
of review as reflected in its Memorandum Order attached hereto as an Appendix. 
Id. 
 25. Id. at *12 (noting that “[b]ecause of Plaintiffs’ failure to prove an organic causation for 
this illness, we find that the treatment Mrs. Blake received is only more convincing proof that she 
suffered a mental illness within the terms of the policy.”). 
 26. See, e.g., H.R. 634, 79th Gen. Assem., 1st Sess. (Iowa 2001).  This bill prohibits an 
insurer from completely denying disability insurance coverage on the basis of treatment within the 
previous five years for depression due to pregnancy, postpartum depression, or menopause.  The 
insurer may, however, in such circumstances, require a waiver of coverage for disability due to 
depression for a period of time not to exceed five years from the date of coverage.  Id. 
6
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postpartum depression before they leave the hospital.27  We have bills 
that would require the offering of postpartum screening during the first 
year of postnatal check-up visits,28 bills that would provide social 
services to new mothers suffering from postpartum depression,29 bills 
that would increase funding for research on postpartum conditions at the 
National Institutes of Health,30 bills that would require States to compile 
and synthesize data relating to postpartum depression and psychosis,31 
and, of course, bills that would proclaim certain days and months in 
certain states as Postpartum Depression Awareness Day32 and Month.33 
When I reviewed the legislative findings of many of the early and 
approved versions of these bills, I saw that at least part of the impetus 
for the new legislation was an improved understanding of the 
physiological bases of the postpartum mood disorders.  For example, in 
a 2003 California bill requesting two state agencies to work together to 
improve women’s access to mental health care, the California Assembly 
specifically noted that physiological factors are believed to play a role in 
postpartum mood and anxiety disorders.34  In a 2000 New Jersey bill 
appropriating $50,000 for postpartum depression education, screening, 
and treatment, the New Jersey Legislature found that postpartum 
depression is the result of physiological reactions to childbirth and that it 
involves several physiological disorders, including chemical 
 
 27. See, e.g., Mom’s Opportunity to Access Health, Education, Research, and Support for 
Postpartum Depression Act (MOTHERS Act), S. 1375, 110th Cong., (2007) (requiring grants that 
would “provide education to women who have recently given birth, and their families, concerning 
postpartum depression, postpartum mood and anxiety disorders, and postpartum psychosis . . . 
before such women leave their birthing centers . . . .”). 
 28. See id. (requiring grants that would “provide for the screen[ing of] new mothers for 
postpartum conditions during their first year of postnatal checkup visits, including the standard 6-
week postnatal checkup visit”). 
 29. See id. (requiring grants that would “provide for the delivery of essential services to 
individuals with postpartum conditions and their families.”). 
 30. See id. (being “[a] bill to . . . increase research at the National Institutes of Health on 
postpartum depression.”). 
 31. See, e.g., H.6567, Jan. Sess. (R.I. 2001) (Rhode Island House Resolution directing the 
Rhode Island Department of Health to establish a panel to compile and synthesize data relating to 
postpartum depression and psychosis). 
 32. See S. Res. 164, 210th Leg. (N.J. 2003) (declaring June 25, 2003, as Postpartum 
Depression Awareness Day in the State of New Jersey). 
 33. See, e.g., Assem. Con. Res. 51, Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2003) (proclaiming the month of May 
2003 as Postpartum Mood and Anxiety Disorder Awareness Month in the State of California). 
 34. Id. (providing “WHEREAS, The medical community does not fully understand or 
recognize all factors contributing to postpartum mood and anxiety disorders, but it is believed that 
these disorders are caused by physiological factors . . . .”). 
7
Tovino: Remarks: Neuroscience, Gender, and the Law
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2009
15-TOVINO2_COPYFORPRINTER.DOC 4/24/2009  2:47 PM 
948 AKRON LAW REVIEW [42:941 
imbalances.35  In two 2007 federal bills, Congress admitted that the exact 
causes of the postpartum mood disorders are complex and unknown, but 
Congress did make references to findings relating to steep and rapid 
drops in hormones after childbirth as contributing factors.36 
When I dug a little deeper, I found evidence that our federal and 
state legislators were exposed to lobbyists and stakeholders who were 
familiar with the neuroscience of the postpartum mood disorders and 
who were using this science to push their legal agendas.  Just as one of 
many possible examples, the Postpartum Support International 
organization (PSI) issued a position paper that was sent to multiple state 
legislatures that relies on contemporary neuroscience to argue for 
changes in civil and criminal legislation and the treatment of women 
suffering from postpartum conditions.37  PSI specifically argues that the 
neuroscience of postpartum depression and psychosis must be conveyed 
to legislators, policymakers, and lay juries.38  Without neuroscience, PSI 
believes that mentally ill women will not receive equal treatment or 
representation under the law and in the courtroom, and that juries will 
not be making informed decisions, especially in infanticide cases.39 
We see this type of neuroscience-based argumentation not only in 
position papers and op-ed pieces, but also in the abstract, summary, and 
conclusion sections of scientific research studies and review articles.  
For example, a physician author of a review article published in the 
American Journal of Psychiatry recently argued that neuroscientific 
 
 35. Assem. 2775, 209th Leg. (N.J. 2000) (providing that “[t]he Legislature finds and declares 
that: (a) Postpartum depression is the name given to a wide range of . . . physiological reactions to 
childbirth . . . [and] (b) Postpartum depression is the result of a chemical imbalance triggered by a 
sudden dramatic drop in hormonal production after the birth of a baby . . . .”). 
 36. See, e.g., MOTHERS Act, supra note 27  (providing “[t]he Congress finds as follows: . . . 
The causes of postpartum depression are complex and unknown at this time; however, contributing 
factors include: a steep and rapid drop in hormone levels after childbirth”); Melanie Blocker-Stokes 
Postpartum Depression Research and Care Act, H.R. 20, 110th Cong., (2007) (providing “[t]he 
Congress finds as follows . . . The causes of postpartum depression are complex and unknown at 
this time; however, theories include a steep and rapid drop in hormone levels after childbirth”). 
 37. Margaret G. Spinelli, Position Paper on Infanticide Associated with Postpartum Mental 
Illness, POSTPARTUM SUPPORT INT’L, http://postpartum.net/resources/healthcare-pros/position-
paper-infanticide/ (last visited January 20, 2008). 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
Sentences for women who commit infanticide vary remarkably because insanity laws 
differ from state to state and lack input from the psychiatric community . . . by 
emphasizing punishment rather than prevention and treatment, the U.S. fails to enlighten 
society about the impact of mental illness on thought and behavior.  We abandon the 
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evidence should be used to eliminate the disparate treatment of ill 
mothers under the law and as support for the argument that ill mothers 
need treatment, not punishment.40 
In addition to the postpartum mood disorders, I am also examining 
the changing legal understanding and treatment of other gender-specific 
conditions such as premenstrual dysphoric disorder and eating disorders, 
which we might call gender-prevalent conditions because girls and 
women have them more than boys and men, although their incidence in 
boys and men is on the rise.41  Here, neuroscience is impacting the law 
in at least two different ways.  The first way relates to the way in which 
litigants and courts interpret the mental health benefits that are subject to 
a state or federal mental health parity legislative or regulatory mandate.  
Some background information regarding the mental health parity debate 
is necessary before proceeding.42 
Although insurance plans initially offered physical and mental 
health benefits under the same terms and conditions, many health 
insurance plans, including employer-based plans, began reducing their 
mental health benefits in the 1970s.  Insurers and employers justified 
these benefit reductions on the grounds that mental health treatments 
were more expensive than treatments for physical illnesses.  Patients 
with mental health conditions, on the other hand, worried that the stigma 
associated with mental illness, as well as their inability to literally prove 
the existence of the mental health condition through routine blood, urine, 
X-ray, or other diagnostic tests, caused the less comprehensive coverage.  
Whatever the cause, the result is what we referred to as a mental health 
benefit disparity.  Some health insurance plans that cover 365 days of 
inpatient care for physical illnesses, for example, might cover only forty-
five days of inpatient care for mental disorders.  Plans that provide 
 
 40. See Margaret G. Spinelli, Maternal Infanticide Associated with Mental Illness: Prevention 
and the Promise of Saved Lives, 161 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1548 (2004) (stating that, “contemporary 
neuroscientific findings support the position that a woman with postpartum psychosis who commits 
infanticide needs treatment rather than punishment and that appropriate treatment will deter her 
from killing again” and that the “absence of formal DSM-IV diagnostic criteria for postpartum 
psychiatric disorders promotes disparate treatment under the law”; concluding that, “the psychiatric 
community should develop guidelines for the treatment of postpartum disorders, foster sharing of 
knowledge between psychiatry and the law, and do more to enlighten society about the effects of 
mental illness on thought and behavior so that decisions about the treatment and punishment of 
mentally ill persons will not be left exclusively in the hands of the judicial system.”). 
 41. Margarita Tartakovsky, Eating Disorders in Men, PSYCHCENTRAL, Oct. 7, 2008, 
available at  http://psychcentral.com/blog/archives/2008/10/07/eating-disorders-in-men/ (noting that 
“[o]ut of 3000 people with anorexia and bulimia, 25 percent were men”). 
 42. The background information provided in the next five paragraphs is taken from Stacey A. 
Tovino, Neuroscience and Health Law: An Integrative Approach?, 42 AKRON L. REV. 469 (2009). 
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unlimited outpatient visits for treatment of physical illnesses might allow 
only twenty outpatient visits for treatment of mental disorders.  And 
plans that cover all or maybe 80 percent of the cost of treatment for 
physical illnesses might cover only 50 percent or less of the cost of 
treatment for a mental illness. 
In the late 1980s, some patients who were denied additional mental 
health benefits responded by suing their insurers, arguing that their 
conditions were physical rather than mental in nature and thus covered 
under the better set of benefits.  In these contract-based lawsuits, the 
plaintiffs’ experts routinely referenced advances in the behavioral and 
brain sciences to support their testimony.  Sometimes the patients won, 
sometimes they did not, but the results all depended on whether the 
expert witnesses could prove using physical evidence that the plaintiff 
had a “real” disease. 
Frustrated with these piecemeal lawsuits, many patients and patient 
advocacy organizations began in the early 1990s to lobby Congress and 
state legislatures for health insurance parity, reasoning that there was no 
biological justification for the unequal insurance coverage of mental and 
physical conditions by health insurance plans.  By the mid-1990s, 
proponents of mental health parity had achieved some success at the 
federal and state level, including the federal Mental Health Parity Act of 
1996,43 which required some, but not all, group health plans to provide 
equality for any annual or lifetime aggregate spending caps imposed 
within the plan.44  Many states also enacted their own mental health 
parity laws, which vary widely in scope.  At the heart of all of this 
mental health parity legislation is the idea that insurers need to 
 
 43. Pub.L. 104-204, Title VII, 110 Stat. 2944 (1996). 
 44. On October 3, 2008, President George W. Bush signed the Emergency Economic 
Stabilization Act of 2008 (EESA) into law.  H.R. 1424, Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 
2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 110th Cong. (Oct. 3, 2008).   Division C, Title V, Subtitle B of the 
EESA contains the Paul Wellstone and Pete Domenici Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity 
Act of 2008 (MHPA’08).  Very generally, MHPA’08 builds on the Mental Health Parity Act of 
1996 by amending the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, the Public Health Service Act, 
and the Internal Revenue Code to require group health plans that provide both medical and surgical 
benefits and mental health or substance use disorder benefits to ensure that:  (1) the financial 
requirements, such as deductibles and copayments, applicable to mental health or substance use 
disorder benefits are no more restrictive than the predominant financial requirements applied to 
substantially all medical and surgical benefits covered by the plan; (2) there are no separate cost 
sharing requirements that are applicable only with respect to mental health or substance use disorder 
benefits; (3) the treatment limitations applicable to such mental health or substance use disorder 
benefits are no more restrictive than the predominant treatment limitations applied to substantially 
all medical and surgical benefits covered by the plan; and (4) there are no separate treatment 
limitations that are applicable only with respect to mental health or substance use disorder benefits.  
Id. 
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reimburse treatments for mental illnesses in the same way they do for 
physical illnesses. 
Some state laws define mental health benefits in terms of 
conditions listed in the DSM-IV45 or the current version of the ICD,46 
both of which identify and classify mental disorders.  Some jurisdictions 
do this even though the DSM-IV states in its introduction that a mental 
condition’s inclusion in the manual should not imply that the condition 
meets legal criteria for what constitutes a mental disease, disorder, or 
disability, and that there is an imperfect fit between the law on the one 
hand and disease classification for clinical diagnostic purposes on the 
other.47  The way in which neuroscience is impacting the law here is that 
stakeholders are using neuroscientific findings to urge the inclusion of 
additional conditions in these classification manuals.  Once a condition 
is classified in the DSM-IV or the current version of the ICD, many state 
laws require health insurance benefit parity for that condition.48 
The gender-specific condition of premenstrual dysphoric disorder 
(PMDD) is illustrative.  PMDD is not currently classified as a mental 
disorder in the main part of the DSM-IV, although Appendix B to the 
manual does list PMDD as a condition that should be studied further in 
the future.49  Stakeholders are using the findings of recent studies 
investigating the neuroscience of PMDD, some of which suggest that 
PMDD is due, at least in part, to a surge in progesterone during the luteal 
phase of the menstrual cycle and related amygdala activation,50 to 
support the inclusion of PMDD as a mental disorder in the DSM-IV.  If 
PMDD is included as a mental disorder in the forthcoming DSM-V, 
states that specifically define mental illnesses in terms of the DSM-IV 
will require health insurance benefit parity for PMDD treatments. 
The second way in which neuroscience is impacting the mental 
health parity debate is in states that are less specific and mandate equal 
insurance coverage if the mental condition “is caused by a biological 
 
 45. DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS, 4th ed., Text Revision 
(2000) [Hereinafter DSM-IV]. 
 46. WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, INTERNATIONAL STATISTICAL CLASSIFICATION OF 
DISEASES AND RELATED HEALTH PROBLEMS, 10th Rev. (2007) [Hereinafter ICD]. 
 47. DSM-IV, supra note 45, at xxii-xxiii. 
 48. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 38a-514(a) (2008) (requiring insurance providers to 
provide coverage for mental disorders “as defined in the most recent edition of the American 
Psychiatric Association’s ‘Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders,’” excluding less 
serious disorders such as caffeine-related disorders). 
 49. DSM-IV, supra note 46, at 759, 771-774. 
 50. See, e.g., Joan Arehart-Treichel, Brain Imaging Suggests Origin of Premenstrual 
Dysphoric Disorder, 42(18) PSYCHIATRIC NEWS 13 (2007). 
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disorder of the brain . . . . ”51  New Jersey is one of these States.52  
Nebraska goes one step further and expressly ties its current definition of 
serious mental illness to the state of medical science when it requires 
benefit parity for “any mental health condition that current medical 
science affirms is caused by a biological disorder of the brain.”53  When 
a state law expressly refers to the current state of medical science in its 
insurance parity mandate, patients, insureds, and other stakeholders are 
encouraged to refer to scientific studies that support the classification of 
their mental health conditions as biological disorders of the brain. 
Stakeholders are thus beginning to refer to scientific studies to 
achieve their mental health parity goals.  For example, several recent 
neuroimaging studies have found structural and functional differences in 
the brains of women with both active and recovered eating disorders.54  
In some states, lobbyists have referenced these studies en route to 
successfully arguing that eating disorders should be included within the 
statutory list of mental health conditions that require equal insurance 
benefits.55 
In summary, I have shown how stakeholders are using advances in 
neuroscience to secure health care benefits under health insurance 
policies and health plans and to push for the application of mental health 
parity legislation.  More broadly, though, I hoped to show how 
neuroscience is quickly becoming a very important tool in the arsenal of 
the health care lobbyist, especially those charged with promoting 
women’s access to mental health care.  When we have conditions that 
are unpopular, as are mental health conditions, or conditions that to this 
day are debated, as are many women’s health conditions, neuroscience is 
quickly becoming the lobbyist’s and stakeholder’s answer. 
The question becomes: How do we assess these neuroscience-based 
claims, especially when they are made in the civil and regulatory health 
care context as opposed to the criminal context?  I have time for two 
quick points.  First, what gives me cause for pause is not so much the 
 
 51. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17B:27A-19.7 (1999). 
 52. Id. 
 53. NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-792(5)(b) (1999). 
 54. See, e.g., E.K. Lambe et al., Cerebral Gray Matter Volume Deficits after Weight Recovery 
from Anorexia Nervosa, 54(6) ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 537 (1997); M. Mühlau et al., Gray 
Matter Decrease in the Anterior Cingulate Cortex in Anorexia Nervosa, 164(12) AM. J. 
PSYCHIATRY 1850 (2007); Angela Wagner et al., Altered Reward Processing in Women Recovered 
from Anorexia Nervosa, 164(12) AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1842 (2007). 
 55. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1374.72(d)(8) and (9) (2008) (California’s 
mental health parity law provision that mandates equal insurance coverage for a range of severe 
mental illnesses, including anorexia nervosa and bulimia nervosa). 
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stakeholders’ use of neuroscience, which I suppose is inevitable, but the 
appropriateness of many of the stakeholders’ normative arguments.  In 
some of these cases, stakeholders are making wonderful arguments that 
many of us, or at least some of us, might agree with.  Take, for example, 
the argument that treatments for postpartum depression should be 
covered by health insurance companies in the same way that traditional 
physical conditions, such as orthopedic conditions, already are, so that 
we can prevent cases like Andrea Yates from happening again.  In other 
civil and regulatory health care cases, however, I am starting to see a 
common argument that every type of structural and functional brain 
difference – even differences between men’s and women’s brains in 
terms of emotional responses to language and images – is evidence of a 
health condition that should be treated and reimbursed and, sometimes, a 
disability that requires protected status and benefits under federal and 
state disability discrimination and disability benefit law.  We need to be 
very careful here.  Many structural and functional differences are just 
that – differences.  They are differences that may be individual 
differences, characteristic differences, or adaptation differences, but they 
are not necessarily evidence of an illness for which treatment is 
medically necessary and for which payment must be made by our 
commercial and public health insurance plans.  I anticipate that our 
judges and juries will be left to determine whether many of these 
structural and functional differences are health conditions to which legal 
protections and benefits should flow, even though our non-scientifically 
and non-clinically trained judges and jurors are perhaps the least 
equipped to do so. 
Second, just as in criminal law, we have a number of relevance and 
reliability problems when we start using neuroscience-based arguments 
in the civil and regulatory health care contexts.  Just as one example, 
almost all of the postpartum studies I referenced in this talk were very 
small studies, most with less than fifteen ill mothers and an equal 
number of healthy postpartum controls.  When a non-scientifically or 
non-clinically trained stakeholder relies on a scientific study to make a 
legal argument, I can almost guarantee you that there are going to be a 
few errors in translation. 
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